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he decade of the 2010s has seen the frequent 
use of behavioral insights to encourage citi-
zen compliance with the payment of taxes. Of par-
ticular interest is descriptive social norms, which 
became the poster child of this approach, as shown 
by the now famous trials carried out by the UK’s 
tax authority, HMRC (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & 
Vlaev, 2017). At the same time as there have been 
successes with these kinds of interventions, there 
are also other occasions when norms do not work 
or can backfire, which is particularly evident in the 
energy field where it can highlight non-conformity 
with desired social outcomes (Cialdini, 2003). 
There are some null results in the tax field too (e.g. 
Castro & Scartascini, 2015).  
The question for both social scientists and 
policy-makers is whether they can be more confi-
dent in knowing when behavioral interventions, 
such as social norms, work or not. Rather than as-
suming there is a toolbox of known effective inter-
ventions to offer policy-makers, there are limits to 
the use of such tools, knowledge of which can help 
policy-makers target them to where they work best. 
Ideally, it would be preferable to have very large 
sample sizes where effects in different locations 
could be ascertained, or where treatment designs 
can be varied in their precise delivery and compared 
in meta-analyses. Because of the tendencies toward 
customized designs with specific client groups, 
which are not repeated, knowledge about internal 
and external validity can only be acquired gradually 
by drawing conclusions from each study. The study 
reported here aims to add to the knowledge base in 
this vein, seeking to explain null and negative re-
sults from a descriptive social norms treatment in 
the payment of local taxes to a central London local 
authority.  
The study has a number of features that 
make the drawing of inferences superior to a single 
study. The experiment compared two interventions, 
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one a simplification of the documentation of the 
tax reminder, the other a social norms message. 
The simplification worked, which gives confidence 
about the delivery of the treatments and their likely 
impact on taxpayers. The second is the factorial de-
sign, which allowed for a comparison of the social 
norms’ message across both simplified and non-
simplified designs (and vice versa). The third is the 
repetition of the social norms’ treatment for all res-
idents in the borough, a year after the first interven-
tion, which allowed for a second test on a larger 
number of taxpayers. The fourth feature is that 
some of the taxpayers in the first experiment were 
part of the second intervention, creating longitudi-
nal aspect to the study for some taxpayers. Such 
features allow for questions to be asked about the 
null effect that would not have been possible in a 
simple treatment versus control design. Also, be-
cause of a similar experiment using social norms in 
another local authority that worked in delivering a 
treatment effect, it is possible to come to some ten-
tative conclusions about the reasons for the results 
from this experimental design. 
 
Background and Motivation: 
Simplification and Social Norms 
 
The use of behavioral insights to improve the qual-
ity of public administration has been one of the suc-
cess stories of behavioral public policy. Whereas 
behavioral public policy may be designed to have a 
direct impact on policy outcomes, such as in health 
or education (Oliver, 2013), its initial expansion 
was over improving the quality of public admin-
istration. A particular focus has been on the high 
transaction activities, such as revenue collection, 
which is related to the relative ease at which ran-
domization can occur, the statistical power of inter-
ventions with large sample size, and clear financial 
benefits to the agency from the high volumes of 
payments as even small percentage changes in out-
comes can significantly affect revenue flows. It is 
no surprise then that one of the first domains for 
large-scale randomizations of behavioral insights 
was on HMRC revenue collection in the UK 
(Hallsworth et al., 2017). 
Two kinds of behavioral insights are par-
ticularly appropriate for the redesign of communi-
cations to improve the payment of taxes and fees. 
One is simplification, which reduces the cognitive 
burden of reading official communication, in-
creases the directness of the response, and high-
lights the key communication, making it more sali-
ent that the individual has to act. Reducing the 
amount of text can allow for better design of the 
page, and which can allow key messages to be 
placed where the eye naturally falls when individu-
als first look at a letter. Reducing psychological fric-
tion has been tried with tax benefits (Bhargava & 
Manoli, 2012, 2015). Simplification, particularly of 
the language used, has been a consistent theme in 
the redesign of health interventions (Zarcadoolas, 
2011). In the UK, it has been used to redesign re-
minders for disability car parking badges with good 
effect (John & Blume, 2017). It would seem to be 
particularly appropriate for taxation communica-
tions because the accountancy and finance profes-
sionals in this domain may wish to express the pre-
cise nature of the request in a way that is consistent 
with values of transparency and full disclosure, but 
where the resultant official documentation can be 
dense and inaccessible for recipients. The conclu-
sion to draw is that simplification designs are easy 
wins for local delivery organizations and provide 
positive effects that are transferable across many 
domains.  
The other effective choice for a transfera-
ble intervention is social norms, in particular de-
scriptive social norms. This is a powerful message 
because it is assumed that people will update their 
behavior toward the norm out of fear of non-con-
formity and from social pressure. There is a consid-
erable evidence from across a range of domains, 
such as energy, littering, voting, and recycling waste, 
that it works (Allcott, 2011; Cialdini, 2003; Gerber 
& Rogers, 2009; Schultz, 1999). Tax compliance is 
analogous to these other outcomes in the sense that 
the norm of compliance is non-controversial and 
has a public benefit. The difference is that tax com-
pliance is legally sanctioned, and the conclusion of 
much of the literature is that the communication of 
the likelihood of enforcement is more likely to be 
successful than messages with normative content 
(Blumenthal, Christian, Slemrod, & Smith, 2001; 
Coleman, 1996; Iyer, Reckers, & Sanders, 2010). 
For example, communicating the likelihood of au-
dit has been shown to work, either from RCTs 
(Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, & Saez, 
2011; Slemrod, Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001) or 
in experiments done in the laboratory (Spicer & 
Thomas, 1982; Tan & Yim, 2012). Moral suasion 
and appeals on their own do not always work 
(McGraw & Scholz, 1991; Torgler, 2013), though 
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they can in the right conditions (see Hasseldine, 
Hite, James, & Toumi, 2007). Appeals to fairness 
are sometimes effective (Wenzel, 2006), such as 
shaming (Coricelli, Rusconi, & Villeval, 2014). In-
creasing the level of punishment can even reduce 
compliance if people perceive it to be unfair 
(Murphy, 2008). There is also evidence that giving 
feedback to taxpayers affects their behavior 
(Wenzel, 2005). 
Enforcement and social approaches need 
not be competitors, however. With tax compliance, 
if the norm is payment and this is high, the social 
norm may also indicate the probability of being 
caught in that authorities may be believed to be 
concentrating on a smaller number of non-payers. 
Information about the actual numbers of non-pay-
ers at a particular moment in time is not usually 
public (as opposed to the final accounts), so indi-
viduals can update their expectations from the new 
information, which are usually at a lower rate than 
the revealed figure. The greater awareness of the 
enforcement agency, and its efficiency, can be con-
sistent with messages that convey a social element 
to paying fines.  
Indicating the potential of social interven-
tions, taxes and fines messaging in a range of juris-
dictions have been subjected to social norm tests 
with positive results (Carpio, 2013; Coleman, 2007; 
Hallsworth et al., 2017; Kettle, Hernandez, Ruda, 
& Sanderson, 2016; Sigala, Burgoyne, & Webley, 
1999). However, in spite of a growing number of 
tax experiments (for reviews, see Hallsworth, 2014; 
Mascagni, 2017), the number of published field ex-
periments showing the positive effects of descrip-
tive social norms (as opposed to moral suasion) still 
remains relatively few. Moreover, in some fee inter-
ventions, norms do not always work, such as when 
the population is heterogeneous and temporarily 
resident, as with students (Silva & John, 2017). An 
experiment in Argentina, conveying whether tax-
payers were aware that only three out of ten taxpay-
ers did not pay their tax liabilities, did not work ei-
ther (Castro & Scartascini, 2015). These contrary 
findings should not be too surprising because the 
contexts within which behavioral interventions 
vary, such as the extent to which information flows 
in the social network. A large number of studies 
across a range of jurisdictions would be needed for 
a meta-analysis and at present the evidence base is 
not strong enough to provide one. Research does 
not give a strong indication of exactly when social 
norms work or not. 
Experiment 1: Study Design 
 
The study site was the London Borough of Lam-
beth, an inner-London local authority on the south 
bank of the River Thames, three miles (4.8 km) 
wide and seven miles (11 km) long, with 219,396 
residents. The borough is highly heterogeneous: 
57.1% have white ethnicity (it is the 11th most di-
verse local authority in England). Typical of Lon-
don, there is a large variation in levels of income 
and wealth. Local tax bills (called the council tax) 
are sent to individual households, which the council 
selected as the appropriate unit to measure to the 
impact of the behavioral interventions. The exper-
iment was run for the 2014-2015 financial year 
across three wards within the borough. In co-de-
sign sessions with the council, a factorial design was 
agreed that deployed commonly used behavioral in-
sights of simplification and social norms. These de-
signs are captured in Figures 1-3. The exact level of 
social norm was decided by examining revenue pay-
ments across borough, including late payments and 
those in debt recovery so as to produce a truthful 
figure.  
It was agreed that the experiment would 
focus solely on accounts that were ‘cash payers’ 
(those which were not currently using automated 
payments such as direct debit), since collection 
rates among automated payers were already very 
high. Since the treatments were based on modifying 
the paper council tax bill, people who paid through 
e-billing were not considered within the scope of 
the experiment, as the e-mails they receive are not 
the same as standard paper bills. 
The three wards were selected on the basis 
of current payment rates, which were below aver-
age for the borough, but not at the lowest level. The 
rationale for this was that they gave the greatest 
scope for achieving a statistically significant effect 
with a low ceiling, but where non-payment was not 
the norm. The wards selected were Thornton, 
Ferndale, and Brixton Hill, which had collection 
rates at 7th January 2014 of 84.48, 84.44, and 
84.29% respectively. The collection rate for the 
borough as a whole was 84.83% for the same pe-
riod. Overall borough collection rates for the pre-
vious year, including late-payments and debt recov-
ered, was 95%. 
Households in the three wards were ran-
domly allocated into four groups using Excel’s ran-
dom seed generator (rand): the first group received 
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the normal annual bill (the control group); the sec-
ond group received the simplified bill; the third 
group were sent the social norm bill; and the fourth 
group received the combined simplification and so-
cial norm bill. As each council taxpayer has an in-
dividual account reference, it was straightforward 
to monitor the integrity of the data in tracking the 
treatment effect. The allocation to the treatment 
groups is balanced as shown in Table 1, which re-
ports the results of regression of treatment alloca-
tion on council ward covariates and the council tax 
band (there are eight bands according to the prop-
erty value of the household). 
At the end of February, a list of accounts 
for the three selected wards was compiled and 
those accounts that were not suitable for inclusion 
in the experiment sample were removed. These in-
cluded: those with automated payment methods 
(e.g. direct debit) in place; accounts where an ex-
emption from council tax had been awarded; ac-
counts where full Council Tax Support (CTS) for 
2013-14 had been awarded; those accounts with e-
billing set up; and void accounts. The resulting list 
Figure 1 
Simplification treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Social norm treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Combined (social norm + simplification) treatment 
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of accounts remaining in the sample were only cash 
payers who would be liable for a payment for 2014-
15 and who received a paper bill. Council tax bills 
were sent out at the beginning of March, with the 
first payments for 2014-15 due on or before 1st 
April. The accounts were then monitored over a 
period of one month to measure the effect that the 
different letters had on levels of council tax pay-
ment.   
The outcome data were captured on 8th 
April, one week after the deadline for making a first 
payment for the 2014-15 financial year, immedi-
ately prior to reminder notices being sent out, to 
account holders who had not made their first pay-
ment on time. The final sample size for the trial was 
7,951 individual account holders. These were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four groups:  control 
group (normal bill), 1,975; simplification, 1,988; so-
cial norm, 2,015; simplification + social norm, 
1,973.  
After the experiment started and before 
the randomization was undertaken, the circum-
stances of some accounts had changed, such as be-
ing awarded Council Tax Support or some other 
arrangement that means no payment was due on 
the account on 1st April 2014. In these circum-
stances the account status was recorded as ‘no pay-
ment due’. Other accounts had been closed, where 
the resident has moved out of the borough or the 
liability for payment had ended. If the liability end 
date was before 1st April 2014 then no payment 
would be due, if it was after 1st April then the bal-
ance would be due as a single sum, but additional 
time is given to account holders to make this pay-
ment. These were recorded as ‘vacated’. The com-
bined number of vacated and no payment due rec-
ords was within a range of 7.39-7.81% of total sam-
ple size for each group: control group, 87, 62 
(7.54%); simplification, 85, 62, (7.39%); social 
norm, 93, 62, (7.69%); and simplification plus so-
cial norm, 86, 68, (7.81%). In total, 605 records that 
were listed as vacated or no payment due were re-
moved from the analysis of payment levels in the 
‘adjusted sample’, since no payment was any longer 
required on these accounts and there is no bias in 
the treatment allocation from removing them. The 
remaining 7,346 accounts, where a payment was 
due by 1st April 2014, were categorized with one of 
the following statuses: not paid – where no pay-
ment for 2014-15 had been received; paid – where 
the instalment due on 1st April has been paid in full; 
part-paid – where the instalment due on 1st April 
has been paid in part; and direct debit – where the 
account has switched from ‘cash payment’ to pay-
ing by direct debit. Accounts with a ‘paid’ or with a 
‘direct debit’ status were regarded as being paid. 
Where accounts were recorded as ‘part paid’ it was 
decided to classify them as unpaid since they had 
not met the objective of being paid in full. 
 
Experiment 1: Results 
 
Table 2 contains the results from the experiment in 
terms of full payment outcomes and reports the p-
values from a chi-squared test (also corrected for 
multiple comparisons). The table shows that the 
simplification raises payment by 3.8 percentage 
points for the simplification only group. The in-
crease is 4.3 percentage points for the combined 
group, essentially the same treatment impact for the 
simplification-only group. There is no impact of a 
descriptive social norm, nor is there an impact of 
social norm combined with simplification when 
compared to the simplification-only condition.  
There are a small number of residents 
(3.25%) who make part payments who are classi-
fied as non-payers in Table 1. Combining these 
with those who paid in full reproduces the same 
pattern of results. Numbers are too small to pro-
duce meaningful cross-tabulations of part-payers 
on their own, but the difference between 3.29% in 
the control and 4.40% in the combined treatment 
Table 1 
Experiment 1 - balance tests, probit 
regressions on treatment allocation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Simplified Social norm Combined 
    
Brixton -0.0212 0.0677 0.0487 
 (0.0508) (0.0503) (0.0506) 
Ferndale 0.0106 0.0132 -0.0362 
 (0.0499) (0.0503) (0.0507) 
Tax band 0.0297 0.0267 0.0272 
 (0.0178) (0.0183) (0.0181) 
Deprivation 3.68e-08 -5.59e-06 6.96e-07 
 (5.81e-06) (5.95e-06) (5.83e-06) 
Constant -0.0864 -0.0530 -0.0949 
 (0.0692) (0.0691) (0.0693) 
    
Observations 3,952 3,985 3,943 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 2 
Experiment 1 - payment in full (%) by treatment allocation 
 
 Simplified Social Norm Combined Control Total 
Not paid in full 52.91 57.63 52.39 56.68 51.28 
Paid in full 47.09 42.37 47.61 43.32 48.72 
N 1,841 1,860 1,819 1,826 7,346 
P-value  0.022 0.559 0.009   
Adjusted p-value 0.033 0.559 .027   
Note: p-values, chi-square on comparison with control; adjusted p-values using Benjamin & Hochberg 
correction 
 
Table 3 
Experiment 1 - probit regressions of paid in full on treatment allocation 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simplified 0.0954* 0.0864* -0.0788 0.0687 
 (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.113) (0.0448) 
Social norm -0.0243 -0.0299 -0.218 -0.0483 
 (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.114) (0.0447) 
Combined 0.108** 0.102* -0.000472 0.0886* 
 (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.113) (0.0449) 
Deprivation  1.30e-05** 1.30e-05** 1.86e-05*** 
  (4.34e-06) (4.35e-06) (4.04e-06) 
Brixton  0.0936* 0.0928* 0.106** 
  (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0371) 
Ferndale  0.0934* 0.0933* 0.102** 
  (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0372) 
Tax band  0.0651*** 0.0273  
  (0.0131) (0.0253)  
Band*simplified   0.0535  
   (0.0340)  
Band*norm   0.0608  
   (0.0344)  
Band*combined   0.0336  
   (0.0341)  
High-low tax    0.0556 
    (0.0901) 
High-low*simplif    0.145 
    (0.122) 
High-low*norm    0.155 
    (0.123) 
High-low*combi    0.112 
    (0.122) 
Constant -0.168*** -0.537*** -0.421*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0568) (0.0872) (0.0528) 
     
Observations 7,346 7,335 7,335 7,335 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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has a p-value of .08, which is suggestive of an im-
pact while other cross-tabulations have negligible 
differences. 
Regression analysis reported in Table 3 
shows much the same findings, either with just the 
treatment allocations as covariates or with the ad-
dition of the covariates of ward and rank of depri-
vation. The table also allows the posing the ques-
tion as to whether the impact of the treatment is 
conditional on the level of tax band, with higher tax 
bands thought to be more sensitive to the social 
norm on the grounds of high social status groups 
fearing visibility and shaming. But this is not the 
caseinteractions of the treatment with the tax 
band do not prove to be significant, not even when 
dividing taxpayers into higher or lower tax bands 
and interacting on these variables. The results are 
very clear: there is a clear impact for simplification 
but no impact for a social norm, which is reinforced 
in the factorial design where the social norm is var-
ied across two designs, with no impact. 
 
Experiment 2: Study Design 
 
On receiving the findings from the experiment, the 
local authority decided to simplify all the bill re-
minders to obtain the benefits from the design. It 
was decided to test the social norm treatment fur-
ther. In the 2015/2016 tax year, bill reminders were 
redesigned accordingly. The trial sample included 
only accounts that were ‘cash payers’that is those 
not currently using automated payments such as di-
rect debit since collection rates among automated 
payers are very high. Just as in experiment 1, people 
who pay through e-billing were not considered 
within the scope of the trial as the emails they re-
ceive are not the same as the standard paper bill. 
Any households where no payment is due were also 
removed from the trial sample. As with the previ-
ous trial, every qualifying household was randomly 
allocated to a treatment or control group and the 
relevant council tax bill sent. The results were then 
monitored to measure any differences in payment 
levels between the groups. The simplification treat-
ment used in the 2014/2015 trial was adopted as 
the control version of the bill. Some minor changes 
were made to remove superfluous text, but the 
main featurea box at the top of the bill with ‘key 
information’was left unchanged. The social 
norm treatment was unaltered from the earlier trial, 
except that the 95% figure used to indicate the pro-
portion of Lambeth residents that pay their council 
tax was changed to 96% to reflect the most recent 
figures for the borough.   
The resulting sample was randomized into 
28,876 residents in the social norm group, and 
28,877 to the control. The resulting allocation is 
balanced, as indicated by Table 4, which regresses 
the treatment allocation on the covariates. One 
ward is a significant predictor, but with twenty-one 
wards this is consistent with a balanced sample 
overall.  
On 27 February the data were ‘frozen’ for 
annual billing purposes and the corresponding 
council tax bill was then sent out. Between 23 Feb-
ruary, when the randomization was done, and 27 
February, when the live system was taken offline to 
Table 4 
Experiment 2 – probit regression of 
treatment allocation on covariates 
 
  
VARIABLES RCT GROUP 
  
Ward  00AYGA 0.0499 (0.0291) 
Ward  00AYGB 0.0105 (0.0313) 
Ward  00AYGC 0.0170 (0.0297) 
Ward  00AYGD 0.0203 (0.0275) 
Ward  00AYGE 0.0485 (0.0289) 
Ward  00AYGF 0.0222(0.0293) 
Ward  00AYGG 0.00684 (0.0296) 
Ward  00AYGH 0.0693* (0.0295) 
Ward  00AYGJ 0.0420 (0.0278) 
Ward  00AYGK 0.0218 (0.0284) 
Ward  00AYGL 0.0363 (0.0284) 
Ward  00AYGM -0.00559 (0.0291) 
Ward  00AYGN 0.0329 (0.0285) 
Ward  00AYGP 0.0299 (0.0296) 
Ward  00AYGQ -0.00250 (0.0304) 
Ward  00AYGR 0.00712 (0.0295) 
Ward  00AYGS 0.0194 (0.0303) 
Ward  00AYGT 0.0561 (0.0307) 
Ward  00AYGU 0.0436 (0.0285) 
Ward  00AYGW 0.0147 (0.0283) 
Tax band 0.00220 (0.00313) 
Constant 0.984*** (0.0249) 
  
Observations 56,568 
R-squared 0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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process bills, some changes to the accounts oc-
curred, as in the previous year. As a result, the final 
sample size changed from the original randomiza-
tion. In total, 56,568 accounts were included within 
the trial: 27,775 received the social norm bill design 
and 28,793 received the standard (control) bill. 
Data were captured on 8th April, one week after 
the first payment was due, so as to analyze the re-
sponses. Accounts were coded according to re-
sponses under one of six categories: va-
catedwhere the accountholder had vacated and 
no payment was due on 1st April; switched to direct 
debitwhere the account had changed to paying 
by direct debit; no instalmentwhere a change had 
been made to an account, such as the award or re-
moval of Council Tax Support, and as a result on 1 
April no instalment was due; not paidwhere no 
payment had been made against the April instal-
ment; part paidwhere a payment had been made 
against the April instalment but less than the full 
amount owed; and paidwhere full payment of 
the April instalment had been made. As before, ac-
counts with a ‘paid’ or with a ‘direct debit’ status 
were regarded as being paid. Where accounts were 
recorded as ‘part paid’, in line with the approach 
taken in the previous council tax trial, it was de-
cided to classify part-paid accounts as ‘unpaid’ since 
they had not met the objective of being paid in full. 
Accounts where no instalment was due or where 
the account holder had vacated were removed from 
the sample for analysis purposes. This means that 
the final sample for analysis purposes drops to 
52,742. There is no reason to expect these house-
hold moves are correlated with the treatment so bi-
asing the experiment. 
 
Experiment 2: Results 
 
Table 5 contains the results for experiment 2. It 
shows that 41.40% in the treatment group paid in 
full, whereas 43.57% did so in the control, which 
indicates the social norm backfired with less people 
paying in full in the treatment group. This differ-
ence is statistically significant at p < .001, which is 
Table 5 
Experiment 2 - payment in full by 
treatment allocation 
 
 Social 
norm 
Control Total 
Not paid in 
full 
58.60 56.43 57.50 
Paid in full 41.40 43.57 42.50 
N 25,967 26,775 52,742 
p-value  0.000   
Note: p-value, chi-square on comparison with 
control 
 
 
Table 6 
Experiment 2 - probit regressions of paid in full on treatment 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social Norm -0.0555*** -0.0559*** -0.0714*** -0.0649*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0216) (0.0121) 
Tax band  0.0478*** 0.0455***  
  (0.0109) (0.0117)  
Norm*band   0.00478  
   (0.00726)  
High-low    0.108** 
    (0.0399) 
Norm*High-low    0.0561* 
    (0.0238) 
Constant -0.162*** -0.383*** -0.375*** -0.242*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0363) (0.0380) (0.00786) 
     
Observations 52,742 52,742 52,742 52,742 
Note: Ward covariates not reported, Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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different from the non-significant results on the so-
cial norm in experiment 1. There is no significant 
difference between the groups in part-paying the 
taxes (p=.266). Regression analysis is reported in 
Table 6, using robust standard errors clustered on 
ward and with wards as covariates (not displayed). 
Results using robust standard errors are similar to 
those in models without them. The headline result 
confirms the finding from the cross-tabulations. 
The addition of ward and council tax band covari-
ates makes little difference to the results either. The 
impact of the interaction of treatment and council 
tax band is not significant, but the interaction of 
high and low taxpayers and the treatment is positive. 
It appears that the treatment was less likely to back-
fire with higher-tax payers, which is consistent with 
expectations. 
The final piece of analysis concerns the im-
pact of the original treatments from experiment 1 
in wave 2, the financial year after they were intro-
duced. Table 7 contains these regressions, per-
formed on a merged dataset using the taxpayer 
identifiers. The simplification treatment, both in 
simple form and in combination with social norm, 
continue to influence payment in full, whereas the 
social norm treatment on its own does not, which 
is the same pattern of results as before. It is inter-
esting because in wave 2 all bills were simplified so 
all were treated irrespective as to whether they had 
been treated in wave 1. Perhaps the change in the 
design of the bill stimulated a change in behavior, 
which did not occur when all bills across the bor-
ough were the samea small group effector an 
additive treatment. The second model includes in-
teractions between wave 1 and wave 2 treatments, 
that is people who got treated twice with a social 
norm treatment in wave 2. There are no effects here, 
except for the receipt of the double norm, which is 
significant at p. < .10, which indicates that getting 
the norm twice may have had an effect. If replicated 
in other studies, this result would be a new finding 
in the literature on social norms, but it is not possi-
ble to come to a firm conclusion here. In this case, 
the norm message was slightly different in each year 
with wave 1 being 95% whereas wave 2 was 96%. 
It is possible that the double-norm treatment 
caused the residents notice the increase in compli-
ance and they changed their behavior accordingly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The descriptive social norm message in this study 
was not successful in getting households to pay 
their local taxes on time. Not only did it not work, 
it even backfired when rolled out to all residents in 
the borough, which is a first in social norm studies. 
The findings are a puzzle because the literature sug-
gests descriptive social norms should increase pay-
ments, especially in the UK context where other tax 
trials work well. The social norm has also been suc-
cessful in other local council tax jurisdictions in the 
UK. The UK Behavioural Insights Team carried 
out a trial with Medway local authority using a so-
cial norm, increasing payments by 11 percentage 
points (Behavioural Insights Team, 2016; Michael 
Sanders & Miranda Jackman, 2017). This letter said, 
“96 per cent of council tax is paid on time. You are 
currently in the small minority of people who have 
not paid us yet”. There are thus differences to the 
Lambeth intervention. Lambeth used the present 
tense. Medway also had a personalized message 
Table 7 
The impact of Wave 1 treatments on 
Wave 2 paid in full, probit regressions 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Social norm (wave 2) -0.0560*** -0.0589*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0130) 
Simplification (wave 1) 0.0958*** 0.0585 
 (0.0115) (0.0362) 
Social norm (wave 1) 0.00190 -0.0309 
 (0.0194) (0.0181) 
Combined (wave 1) 0.141*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0330) 
Band 0.0480*** 0.0480*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) 
Simplified*wave 2 
norm 
 0.0751 
  (0.0562) 
Social norm*wave 2 
norm 
 0.0700 
  (0.0399) 
Combined*wave 2 
norm 
 -0.0260 
  (0.0639) 
Constant -0.383*** -0.382*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0361) 
   
Observations 52,742 52,742 
Note: Ward covariates not reported; robust stand-
ard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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(‘you are’). The council had more space to convey 
the social norm and to explain it. Another explana-
tion might be due to context in that London is dif-
ferent with a mobile population, which is highly di-
verse so that social norms do not make so much 
sense in comparison to a small town in the more 
rural location of the country of Kent. In London, 
the make-up of the communities is not only diverse, 
but often transitory, with about 12% of the popu-
lation changing each year (Lambeth London 
Borough Council, 2016). It is important to note 
that the Medway trial was targeted at late taxpayers 
whereas the Lambeth one was directed to all cash 
payers, which are different populations so different 
compositions of households.  
However, this interpretation of the results 
would be more consistent with the null results in 
wave 1; but the backfire in wave 2 suggests the 
norm did work, but just not in the way the local 
council expected. In the end, the interaction be-
tween the context of London and the particular 
form of social norm intervention caused people to 
not to settle their bills on time. Even communi-
cating high rates of payment may have alerted re-
spondents to the possibility of non-payment, per-
haps among a wider group of taxpayers who nor-
mally settle up on time. These findings can form 
part of the wider evidence base on social norms, 
whilst not forgetting the positive and sustained re-
sults for one-time simplification.  
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